Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria in LQ RE Models by Blake, Andrew P. & Kirsanova, Tatiana
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Discretionary Policy and Multiple
Equilibria in LQ RE Models
Andrew P. Blake and Tatiana Kirsanova
University of Exeter Business School
9. November 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21901/
MPRA Paper No. 21901, posted 7. April 2010 17:44 UTC
Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria in LQ RE Models∗
Andrew P. Blake†
Bank of England
Tatiana Kirsanova‡
University of Exeter
April 1, 2010
Abstract
We study discretionary equilibria in dynamic linear-quadratic rational expectations mod-
els. In contrast to the assumptions that pervade this literature we show that these models
do have multiple equilibria in some situations. We demonstrate the existence of multiple dis-
cretionary equilibria by example. We investigate general properties of discretionary equilibria
and discuss implications for numerical algorithms.
Key Words: Discretion, Multiple Equilibria, LQ RE models
JEL References: E31, E52, E58, E61, C61
∗We are grateful to Yuting Bai, Stefano Eusepi, Gerhard Freiling, Paul Levine, Simon Price, Neil Rankin,
David Vines, Simon Wren-Lewis and in particular Richard Dennis, Bob King, three anonymous Referees and
the Editor for useful suggestions and discussions. This paper was mostly written when Tatiana Kirsanova was a
Houblon-Norman/George Research Fellow at the Bank of England. It represents the views and analysis of the
authors and should not be thought to represent those of the Bank of England or Monetary Policy Committee
members. All errors remain ours. MATLAB programs that find multiple equilibria in our example are available
from www.people.ex.ac.uk/tkirsano/papers.html
†Address: CCBS, Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London EC2R 8AH; e-mail: an-
drew.blake@bankofengland.co.uk.
‡Address: School of Business and Economics, University of Exeter, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4
4PU; e-mail t.kirsanova@exeter.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
In this paper we study discretionary policy in the class of infinite-horizon discrete-time linear dy-
namic models that is typically used to study aggregate fluctuations in macroeconomics. In such
models the optimizing behaviour of the private sector is characterized by appropriate forward-
looking implementability constraints, with the policy maker acting to maximize a quadratic intra-
temporal objective. We discuss and illustrate the potential for the existence of multiple rational
expectations equilibria in this class of models, usually termed Linear Quadratic Rational Expec-
tations (LQ RE) models. The class of LQ RE models is of considerable applied interest because it
can — under appropriate conditions — be interpreted as a quadratic approximation to the underly-
ing non-linear optimal policy problem. If a multiplicity of equilibria arises then this can generate
rich dynamics, with alternating periods of high and low volatility of aggregate macroeconomic
variables.
The existence of multiple equilibria in non-linear models is now well established. Albanesi
et al. (2003) and King and Wolman (2004) demonstrate how discretionary policy generates a
multiplicity of equilibria, where the non-linearity gives rise to dynamic complementarities in the
pricing decisions of different firms in the private sector. In standard LQ RE models the private
sector is aggregated and these types of equilibria do not exist. Simply by virtue of their linearity,
such models are often treated as immune to multiplicity.1 This class of models is routinely used
in policy analysis and forms much of the basis for our understanding of policy equilibria; the
standard New Keynesian model is frequently used to demonstrate results that are presumed valid
for the whole class of LQ RE models under discretion.2
We show that any such inference is fundamentally incorrect. In contrast to the assumption
that pervades the literature, we show that LQREmodels do have multiple discretionary equilibria.
Further, we describe different types of discretionary equilibria that can exist in non-degenerate
LQ RE models and show how knowledge of the source of multiplicity can help us locate these
different policy equilibria.
Our definition of discretionary policy is conventional and is widely used in the monetary policy
literature, see e.g. Backus and Driffill (1986), Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Clarida et al. (1999), and
Woodford (2003a). At the beginning of each time period the policy maker observes the state
of the economy and makes an optimal decision; all agents also know that the policy maker will
apply the same procedure in every subsequent period. When the private sector expects the policy
maker to pursue discretionary policy in each future period, the best a policy maker can do is to
pursue the discretionary policy: there is no incentive for the policy maker to deviate from it and
the private sector’s expectations are rational. Discretionary policy is credible by construction.
The very property of credibility creates a potential for multiplicity of discretionary equilibria
and makes it impossible for the policymaker to just select the welfare-dominant one. When the
state of the economy is observed, and if the policy maker acts first, then the private sector observes
this policy action and reacts optimally given the state of the economy, the action of the policy
1 In a seminal paper on discretionary policy Oudiz and Sachs (1985, p. 288) suggest an algorithm for finding
an equilibrium and remark: “Although we cannot prove that the resulting function is the unique memoryless,
time-consistent equilibrium, we suspect that it is in fact unique, in view of the linear-quadratic structure of the
underlying problem.”
2See Woodford (2003b), Vestin (2006), Walsh (2003), Evans and Honkapohja (2003) among many others.
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maker, and its expectations of the future state of the economy. The optimizing policy maker
expects the private sector to react rationally and policy is chosen accordingly. Crucially, the
rational reaction of the private sector is determined by its expectations about the future state of
the economy which, in turn, is affected by the future policy. So the policy maker acts taking into
account the effect of the future policy decisions as expected by the private sector. There are two
further elements to complete the story. First, if there are complementarities between the decisions
of the private sector and the policy maker — complementarities that mean an optimal decision
taken by a policy maker reinforces the decisions of the private sector — then multiple equilibria
can arise. For this to happen the presence of state variables that are affected by agents’ decisions
is necessary, as this ensures the importance of future policy decisions for current actions. Second,
when choosing an optimal policy the current policy maker reacts (indirectly) to the past actions
of the private sector by observing the state of the economy. If there is a multiplicity of equilibria
and (for some reason) the private sector in the past period changed its perception of current and
future policy after the policy maker acted in that past period, then the current policy maker will
find it optimal to validate these expectations and has no power to choose a different equilibrium.
We illustrate our argument first by example and then more generally. The paper is organized as
follows. In the next section we present three examples of increasing complexity. They demonstrate
uniqueness, the existence of multiplicity and the importance of endogenous predetermined states,
and the form of multiplicity in a more general model, respectively. In Section 3 we formally define
the discretionary optimization problem and derive the corresponding first-order conditions. In
Section 4 we discuss the properties of discretionary equilibria in the general class of LQ RE
models. In Section 5 we discuss numerical algorithms to find discretionary equilibria. Section 6
concludes.
2 Multiple Equilibria by Example
We develop our arguments thematically using three models with different features. The first of
these is the standard New Keynesian model that is often used as a benchmark model for results
on discretionary policy. We show the necessary uniqueness of the discretionary equilibrium as
a consequence of a particular disconnect between decisions in current and subsequent periods.
This disconnect, and the absence of important interactions between current and future policy
and the private sector decisions, make this model a very special LQ RE model of discretionary
policy. The uniqueness of equilibria under discretionary policy is then necessarily a special case
and many policy implication derived from the standard New Keynesian model under discretion
may be difficult to generalize.
In the second example we demonstrate the existence of multiple discretionary equilibria. To
do this we must introduce an endogenous state variable, in this case government debt, into the
New Keynesian model. This model is known to generate a multiplicity of determinate regimes
under rules-based policy (Leeper (1991)) which makes it appealing to investigate the existence of
different equilibria under discretion. We demonstrate how dynamic complementarities between
the decisions of the private sector and the policy maker lead to a multiplicity of equilibria. We also
argue that these equilibria are consistent with the empirical evidence documented in a number
of studies.
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Using a third example, a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation, we demonstrate
that discretionary equilibria may also arise because of dynamic complementarities between the
different decisions of the aggregate private sector alone. The nature of this type of multiple
equilibria is different in a number of important ways, in particular implying that there can
be several time-invariant responses of the aggregate private sector to the same policy action;
King and Wolman (2004) call similar equilibria ‘point-in-time’ equilibria. These point-in-time
equilibria generate multiple discretionary equilibria. As our model is linear, complementarities of
this sort can only arise if, for example, the different decisions of the aggregate private sector for
consumption and investment have separate effects on the marginal costs faced by firms. It should
be apparent that this type of complementarity is far from uncommon.
2.1 Standard New Keynesian Model
We start with the standard New Keynesian model as in Clarida et al. (1999), Sec. 3. This model
has become the workhorse for policy analysis, including the analysis of policy under discretion.3
As we show, this model cannot have multiple discretionary equilibria. We begin with it to
introduce definitions and the important ideas that follow, and in particular to showcase the
model features that preclude multiple equilibria. It will also become apparent that these features
are unlikely to exist in the general class of LQ RE models under discretionary policy.
We consider a deterministic perfect-foresight model. The law of motion of the aggregate
economy can be written as
πt = βπt+1 + λct + νbt, (1)
bt+1 = ρbt, (2)
and the initial state b¯ is known to all agents. The only predetermined state variable in this
economy is the exogenous autoregressive process bt. Equation (1) is the New Keynesian Phillips
curve that relates the inflation rate πt positively to the output ct. Parameter β is the private
sector’s discount factor and λ is the slope of the Phillips curve.4 Parameter ν scales the effect of
the exogenous state on inflation. The aggregate agent sets πt in response to the evolution of ct
and bt.
Following Clarida et al. (1999), we assume that the policy maker chooses output ct and then,
conditional on subsequent optimal evolution of ct and πt, decides on the value of interest rate that
achieves the desired ct and πt.
5 The inter-temporal policy maker’s welfare criterion is defined by
the quadratic loss function
Lt =
1
2
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
π2s + αc
2
s
)
. (3)
3See e.g. Woodford (2003b), Vestin (2006), Walsh (2003).
4We assume that the Phillips curve evolves from staggered nominal price setting as in Calvo (1983). The
individual firm price-setting decision, which provides the basis for the aggregate relation, is derived from an explicit
optimization problem. Firms are monopolistically-competitive: When given the opportunity, each firm chooses its
nominal price to maximize profits subject to constraints on the frequency of future price adjustments. Parameter
λ is a function of the frequency of price adjustments.
5Using the interest rate as an instrument implies that consumption and price-setting decisions are made simul-
taneously, while in this model they are consecutive decisions taken by the relevant agent. Here and in the next
example this makes no difference for the results on multiplicity.
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We assume that the policy maker knows the law of motion (1)-(2) of the aggregate economy
when it formulates policy. The policy maker’s decision problem is to find the best policy for every
period, knowing that future policy makers have the freedom to change policy, and knowing that
future policy makers face the same problem.
We assume that the policy maker acts in a discretionary way in the following sense. At every
point t in time the private sector observes the policy that reacts only to the current state, so can
be written in the form6
ct = cbbt. (4)
The private sector expects that the future policy makers will apply the same decision process and
will react to the contemporary state only, i.e. will implement policy (4). We assume that the
aggregate decision of the private sector, taken after the policy maker has acted, can be written
as the linear feedback function
πt = πbbt. (5)
At any time t, the policy maker reacts to the current state (4), knows that the private sector
observes its action, and knows that the private sector expects all future policy makers will apply
the same decision process and implement policy (4). Henceforth we shall refer to parameters that
define the behaviour of the policy maker and the private sector, cb and πb, as ‘decisions’.
Denote the response of the next-period private sector to the next-period state bt+1 as π˜bbt+1
where we qualify the expected private sector decision using a ‘tilde’.7 Now, from
πt+1
eq.(5)
= π˜bbt+1
eq.(2)
= π˜bρbt
eq.(1)
=
1
β
πt − λ
β
ct − ν
β
bt
it follows that the private sector’s decision can also be written as
πt = (βρπ˜b + ν) bt + λct. (6)
If there is a disturbance such that bt > 0 and firms raise inflation to πbbt then this rise is the
result of the reaction to state, (βρπ˜b + ν) bt, and to the policy, λct. Because the policy maker
moves first within each period and because the private sector observes the policy, the private
sector takes into account the ‘instantaneous’ influence of the policy choice, measured by λ. The
first term in (6) shows that the response to the state is also affected by the next-period response
of the private sector to the state, π˜b.
We now complete the definition of discretion. Policy determined by (4) is discretionary if the
policy maker finds it optimal to continue to follow it in every period s > t, given the private
sector (i) knows that in every period s > t future policy makers re-optimize and use the same
decision process, (ii) observes the current policy, (iii) anticipates policy (4) to be implemented in
all future periods.8
6We restrict ourselves to the ‘memoryless’ or Markov equilibria, where agents’ decisions are functions of current
state only. We also assume a linear contemporaneous relationship.
7We shall use this notation in all our examples to denote next-period decisions.
8 In the language of game theory we restrict our attention to time-consistent feedback equilibria with intra-period
leadership, see e.g. de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg (1991), Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Cohen and Michel (1988). Here
and below we simply call such equilibria as ‘discretionary’.
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Figure 1: Discretionary Equilibria
We can write the criterion for optimality, the Bellman equation, as
Lt (bt) = min
ct
(
1
2
(
((βρπ˜b + ν) bt + λct)
2 + αc2t
)
+ βLt+1 (ρbt)
)
,
where we take the intra-period leadership of the policy maker into account by substituting in
constraint (6). Because the per-period loss function in (3) is quadratic and because both policy
maker and private sector decisions are linear in state, the discounted loss will necessarily be
quadratic in bt or
Lt (bt) =
1
2
Sb2t
for some value of S to be determined.
The Bellman equation, written in terms of current and future anticipated losses S and S˜,
becomes
Sb2t = minct
((
((βρπ˜b + ν) bt + λct)
2 + αc2t
)
+ βS˜ (ρbt)
2
)
. (7)
Differentiation of (7) with respect to ct yields the optimal policy response
ct = −(βρπ˜b + ν)λ(
λ2 + α
) bt = cbbt. (8)
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The coefficient cb in (8) determines the optimal policy feedback on predetermined state, bt. Notice
that this coefficient is independent of S˜. When choosing the best policy in period t, the policy
maker knows that future policy makers will re-optimize. For this model this constraint is not
binding. This implies that the optimal policy feedback coefficient cb is a linear function of π˜b,
the future private sector reaction. It is immediately apparent that the disconnect between policy
decisions in times t and s for any t = s only happens if the predetermined state variable is
exogenous, so policy neither affects the state directly nor via an effect on the private sector’s
decision. We plot (8) as the solid line in the top chart in Panel I in Figure 1.9
To complete characterization of discretionary equilibrium it remains to present the optimal
decision of the private sector in the feedback form (5). Substitute (4) into (6) to obtain
πt = (βρπ˜b + ν + λcb) bt = πbbt. (9)
The next-period response to any disturbance positively affects the current-period response to the
same disturbance, but the effect is linear in the decisions of both agents. The effect is linear
because the future state is determined by parameter ρ alone, depending on neither policy nor
private sector decisions.
If the policy is expected to be the same in the next period, the time-invariant aggregate private
sector response is the same, π˜b = πb, and there is a unique solution πb = πb (cb) which is the
linear relation
πb =
ν + λcb
1− βρ (10)
We plot (10) with the dashed line in the top chart in Panel I in Figure 1.
To summarize, we have two linear response functions, cb = cb (πb) and πb = πb (cb) given by
(8) and (10). There is a unique solution, given by
cb = − λν
λ2 + α (1− βρ) , πb =
αν
λ2 + α (1− βρ) .
This was obtained by Clarida et al. (1999), equations (3.4) and (3.5), using a different approach.10
In order to find the value function S we substitute the optimal solution (8) into Bellman
equation (7) and, using that in the discretionary equilibrium the next-period policy is expected
to be the same and so S = S˜, obtain
S =
α (βρπb + ν)
2(
α+ λ2
)
(1− βρ2) ,
which is a quadratic function of the private sector’s response, πb. The stronger the response of
firms to any disturbance, πb, the more costly it is to stabilize the economy, as the optimal policy
has to offset the effect on prices with bigger reduction in output, ct, see (8). Therefore, the overall
9We use parameter values: β = 0.99, λ = 0.1, α = 0.1, and ρ = 0.8.
10Clarida et al. (1999), Sec. 3 do not discuss the details of the interactions between the private sector and the
policy maker, primarily because they are absent in this model. Because of this, the authors can use a simple way
to solve the model that is not valid in a more general case. See their footnote 27.
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loss, as measured by (3), rises as π2b . We plot it in the bottom chart in Panel I in Figure 1. We
further note that the actual speed of stabilization of the economy is determined solely by the
persistence parameter ρ and is exogenous.
The coefficients πb, cb and S describe the solution to the discretionary optimization problem
outlined above. They uniquely define the trajectories {bt, πt, ct}∞t=0 for any given b0 = b¯. Con-
versely, if the sequence {bt, πt, ct}∞t=0 solves the discretionary policy outlined above then there
is a unique triplet {πb, cb, S} that satisfies (4), (5) and (7). We call the triplet of coefficients
{πb, cb, S} a discretionary equilibrium. It follows from the linearity of all agents’ decisions in each
other’s decision variables that the discretionary equilibrium always exists and is unique.
Finally, for this model it is instructive to compute the welfare (equal to minus loss (3)) for
arbitrary decisions cb and πb, but still exploiting the intra-period order of moves. Write this as
Wt = −1
2
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
π2s + αc
2
s
)
= −1
2
(
((βρπb + ν) + λcb)
2 + αc2b
) ∞∑
s=t
βs−tb2s
= −1
2
(
(βρπb + λcb + ν)
2 + αc2b
)
1− βρ2 b
2
t .
The second derivative of this is
∂2Wt
∂πb∂cb
= − βρλ
1− βρ2 b
2
t ,
which is negative for any πb, cb. If it is expected that firms increase inflation in response to
a disturbance to bt then this reduces the marginal return to the policy that increases output
in response to the same disturbance. Cooper and John (1988) define decisions of the private
sector and the policy maker as dynamic substitutes if the optimal decision of the policy maker is
decreasing in the subsequent decision of the private sector, i.e. it is optimal to reduce output if
inflation is expected to rise. Condition ∂
2Wt
∂πb∂cb
< 0 implies dynamic substitutability. In our model
uniqueness is ensured by the linearity of responses, but global dynamic substitutability and the
existence of an equilibrium would also ensure uniqueness.
2.2 New Keynesian Model with Government Debt
2.2.1 Quick Overview of the Example
In our previous example the discretionary equilibrium was unique. For the New Keynesian model
with no endogenous state variable there is a complete separation between the current and future
decisions of agents. This implies the linearity of agents’ decisions and, as we have seen, necessarily
implies the uniqueness of the solution.
In this section we present an example that by contrast has multiple discretionary equilibria.
As before, we consider a deterministic New Keynesian model, but instead include an endogenous
state variable. We assume that the agents observe and can affect the accumulation of the real
government debt. As before, we study the interactions of a single monetary policy maker and an
aggregate private sector.
The accumulation of government debt must depend on the fiscal stance. So in the model there
is a non-optimizing fiscal authority that faces a stream of exogenous public consumption. These
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expenditures are financed by levying income taxes and by issuing one-period risk-free nominal
bonds. We assume that the fiscal authority imposes a simple proportional rule for the tax rate:
if the real debt is higher (lower) than in the steady state then the tax rate rises (falls). We shall
refer to the tax rate as the ‘taxes’ and to the parameter of the proportional rule as the ‘fiscal
feedback’. The size of the fiscal feedback measures the strength of fiscal stabilization of the debt
and, as we shall show, plays an important role in the model. The presence of the non-optimizing
fiscal authority in the economy can be captured by this single parameter.
If this parameter is relatively large then an increase in public debt is practically eliminated by
fiscal policy within few periods. The equilibrium behavior of the discretionary monetary policy
maker and of the private sector is, therefore, similar to the one in the standard New Keynesian
model. In order to reduce the effect of temporarily high taxes on inflation the policy maker lowers
consumption, so that demand falls. This is a low-inflation-volatility equilibrium as the firms set
relatively low inflation anticipating low consumption in the future.
If the fiscal feedback on debt is zero, then an initial increase in the public debt results in a
debt spiral unless one or both agents intervene. If the policy maker intervenes debt is stabilized
only by higher consumption-fuelled demand engineered to raise income and so tax revenues. This
implies a high-inflation-volatility equilibrium as firms set inflation relatively high, reacting to
anticipated high demand in the future.
We shall demonstrate that if the fiscal feedback on debt is moderate — and so debt is only
slowly stabilized by fiscal policy alone — then both equilibria are possible. If the private sector
believes that the future demand will be low and sets low inflation, the next-period policy maker
finds it optimal to validate those beliefs and will reduce demand. Conversely, if the private sector
believes that the future demand will be high and inflates, the next-period policy maker finds it
optimal to validate those beliefs and will increase demand. Following any initial debt displacement
the economy can follow one of several paths, each of which satisfies the conditions imposed on
discretionary policy, i.e. time-invariance and optimality, given that the future policy makers are
assumed to re-optimize.
As we discuss later in Section 2.2.4 the described economic behavior is familiar from the
literature on the fiscal theory of the price level, and is consistent with both the theoretical and
empirical findings.11 A crucial difference is that we study discretionary policy, not just simple
monetary rules. However, because of the similarity with rules-based policy models, we anticipate
our results and expect to find a switch from one equilibrium to another when we vary the strength
of the fiscal feedback. If we do find this then the empirical evidence makes such an example rather
an appealing way to demonstrate the potential existence of multiple equilibria.
2.2.2 Discretionary Equilibria
Aggregate behavior of private agents and the policy maker’s actions. We adopt the
model of Woodford (2001), Benigno and Woodford (2004). We delegate all technical details to
the Online Appendix12 and only present the model log-linearized about the steady state. The
11See e.g. Leeper (1991), Woodford (2001), Davig and Leeper (2006b), Favero and Monacelli (2005).
12The Online Appendix and all necessary MATLAB programs are available from www.people.ex.ac.uk/tkirsano
or upon request from the authors.
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model consists of equations that describe the aggregate behaviour of the private sector and the
evolution of debt. As before, we assume that the policy maker chooses consumption ct.
We assume that nominal debt is observed at the beginning of period t, and define real debt
bt as the nominal beginning-of-period debt deflated by the end-of-previous-period price. The
begining-of-period real debt bt is then the aggregate predetermined state variable in period t.
The economy evolves according to
πt = βπt+1 + λct + νbt, (11)
bt+1 = ρbt − ηct, (12)
and the initial state b¯ is known to all agents. As before, the aggregate agents’ decision variable
is inflation, πt.
Equation (11) is the appropriate New Keynesian Phillips curve.13 Equation (12) describes the
evolution of real debt.14 In contrast to the standard New Keynesian model the state will now be
affected by policy.
The inter-temporal welfare criterion of the policy maker is defined by the quadratic loss
function15
Lt =
1
2
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
π2s + αc
2
s
)
. (13)
The policy maker knows the laws of motion (11)-(12) of the aggregate economy and takes them
into account when formulating policy. The policy maker finds the best action every period, knows
that future policy makers have freedom to change policy, and knows that future policy makers
will apply the same decision process.
Under discretion, at every point in time t decision rules of each agent are linear functions of
the current state
ct = cbbt, (14)
πt = πbbt. (15)
Now we find that
πt+1
eq.(15)
= π˜bbt+1
eq.(12)
= π˜b (ρbt − ηct) eq.(11)= 1
β
πt − λ
β
ct − ν
β
bt,
13 In contrast to the previous example, now marginal cost is a function of consumption and taxes, but taxes are
determined by debt so we have the additional term νbt in (11). If the underlying fiscal feedback rule is τ t = µbt
where τ t is log-linearized tax rate with steady state level τo, then ν = µκτo/ (1− τo) and λ = κ (1/σ + θ/ψ)
where σ and ψ are parameters of private sector utility function, β is the private sector’s discount factor, θ is the
steady-state consumption to output ratio and λ is the slope of the Phillips curve. Public spending is a part of
marginal cost too, but it is assumed to be constant and so does not enter the log-linearized version of the model.
14 It states that real debt at the beginning of the next period t+1 is equal to real debt at the beginning of period
t less taxes collected in period t, and this accumulates at the rate 1/β, which is the real interest rate in the steady
state. Collected taxes change because of either a change in the tax rate, or because of a change in the tax base.
Parameter ρ = (1− µτo) /β is a function of the tax rate, and with stronger feedback µ the debt is stabilized faster.
Parameter η = θτo/β describes the sensitivity of debt to the tax base. We assume that the steady state level of
debt is zero, which eliminates the first-order effect of the interest rate and inflation on debt in (12).
15The criterion is derived under the assumption of steady state labour subsidy. Here parameter α is a function of
model parameters, α = θλ/ǫ, and ǫ is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of monopolistically produced
goods.
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implying the private sector reaction function can also be written as
πt = (βρπ˜b + ν) bt + (λ− βηπ˜b) ct. (16)
So, because the policy maker moves first within each period and because the private sector
observes the policy, the private sector takes into account the ‘instantaneous’ influence of the
policy choice, here measured by (λ− βηπ˜b) . The current-period responses of the private sector
to the state and to the policy action are determined in part by the next-period response of the
private sector to the state, π˜b.
Following the same procedure as before, the Bellman equation characterizing discretionary
policy becomes
Sb2t = minct
((
((βρπ˜b + ν) bt + (λ− βηπ˜b) ct)2 + αc2t
)
+ βS˜ (ρbt − ηct)2
)
. (17)
Discretionary policy. Differentiation of (17) with respect to ct yields the optimal policy re-
sponse
ct = −
(
(βρπ˜b + ν) (λ− π˜bηβ)− βρηS˜
)
(
(λ− βηπ˜b)2 + α+ βη2S˜
) bt = cbbt. (18)
The coefficient cb in (18) determines the optimal policy feedback on the predetermined state, bt,
but now the feedback coefficient is a function of S˜. As S˜ determines the next-period loss and
depends on the whole future path of the state, it is a function of future policy decisions. When
the current-period policy maker chooses the optimal policy, it knows that the next-period policy
maker will re-optimize. In this model this constraint is binding because η = 0. This implies the
non-linearity of cb = cb (π˜b) .
As before, in order to find the equilibrium value function S we substitute the optimal solution
(18) into the Bellman equation (17) and, under the equilibrium condition S = S˜, obtain the
following equation for the value function S
S = (βρπ˜b + ν)
2 + βρ2S − ((βρπ˜b + ν) (λ− βηπ˜b)− βηρS)
2
((λ− βηπ˜b)2 + α+ βη2S)
.
After some straightforward algebra we obtain a quadratic equation for S with a positive leading
coefficient and a negative constant term. This equation has only one nonnegative solution
S =
1
2βη2
(
−
(
(λ− βηπ˜b)2 − β (ρλ+ νη)2 − α
(
βρ2 − 1))
+
√(
(λ− βηπ˜b)2 − β (ρλ+ νη)2 − α (βρ2 − 1)
)2
+ 4αβη2(βρπ˜b + ν)2
)
≥ 0.
We plot S as a function of the equilibrium private sector decision π˜b = πb in the lower chart of
Panel II in Figure 1.16 We comment on the shape later.
16The parameter values are β = 0.99, λ = 0.0582, ν = 0.0025, ξ = 0.925, η = 0.1875 and α = 0.0087. We report
calibration of deep structural parameters in Online Appendix.
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In order to obtain the optimal policy we substitute the equilibrium value of S into the feedback
coefficient in (18) so
cb = − (ρλ+ νη) (βρπ˜b + ν)
(ρα+ (λ− βηπ˜b) (ρλ+ νη)) +
(
−β
(
(λ− βηπ˜b)2 − β (ρλ+ νη)2 − α
(
βρ2 − 1))
+
√(
(λ− π˜bηβ)2 − β (ρλ+ νη)2 − α (βρ2 − 1)
)2
+ 4βαη2(βρπ˜b + ν)2
)
/(2ηβ (ρα+ (λ− βηπ˜b) (ρλ+ νη))) . (19)
The optimal policy feedback coefficient as a function of the equilibrium decision of the private
sector, π˜b = πb, is plotted using a solid line in the top chart in Panel II in Figure 1. In contrast
to the standard New Keynesian model, the decision function is now U-shaped in π˜b, as we now
explain.
Suppose that debt bt is positive and the policy maker knows that firms believe that in the
next period firms will react with higher inflation, π˜b ≫ 0. The policy maker also knows that
current-period firms take into account the ‘instantaneous’ influence of the policy choice, as is
measured by (λ− βηπ˜b) . The profit maximization problem for the firms implies that if any
future response of inflation to debt is strong then higher demand (consumption) implies lower
inflation, so (λ− βηπ˜b) < 0 if π˜b ≫ 0. Hence, in order to reduce the cost of inflation, optimal
policy should increase consumption in response to a higher debt, cb > 0. This also contributes to
the debt stabilization. But a large movement in consumption is also costly, and this imposes a
finite optimal value of cb. In equilibrium, if πb is large then cb also rises. The social loss S is high,
as the response to the positive debt by both consumption and inflation is consequently large.
Now suppose the policy maker knows that firms believe that in the next period firms will
react to positive debt with lower inflation, π˜b ≪ 0. The profit maximization problem for the
firms now implies that if future inflation is low then an increase of demand (consumption) will
raise inflation, so (λ− βηπ˜b) > 0 if π˜b ≪ 0. Hence, the optimal policy is to increase consumption
and cb > 0. This will stabilize debt and moderate the fall in inflation. This regime is also
characterized by high social loss S because of large response of consumption to debt.
Now suppose there is an ‘intermediate’ scenario and in the next period firms are expected
to react only weakly to debt, so π˜b ≃ 0. Now current-period firms will keep inflation low if the
effect of higher taxation on marginal cost (via ν) is approximately offset by the negative effect of
demand. This can only happen if consumption falls, i.e. if cb < 0. A fall in demand slows down
the debt stabilization, but still ensures debt stability. As the effect of taxation is going to reduce
in the future, the next-period profit-optimizing firms are expected to keep inflation low. Hence
a small cb < 0 for small πb ≃ 0 can characterize the optimal policy. The loss is small as in a
response to the higher bt the implied responses of πt and ct are small.
Private sector response. In order to obtain the time-invariant optimal decision of the private
sector we substitute (14) into (16) and obtain
πt = (βρπ˜b + ν + (λ− βηπ˜b) cb) bt = πbbt. (20)
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Future decisions of the private sector π˜b affect the current decisions of the private sector πb. In
a discretionary equilibrium π˜b = πb which yields
πb =
ν + λcb
(1− β (ρ− ηcb)) . (21)
The response of inflation to bt is determined by policy cb. Higher demand increases inflation, but
the current price-setting decisions of firms depend on their future firms’ decisions, which depend
on the future policy and on future debt. With stronger reaction of consumption to debt, cb, the
parameter β (ρ− ηcb) ∈ (0, 1) is smaller and debt is stabilized faster, from (12). This implies that
the discounted effect of the future debt on current inflation is smaller. Hence, the total effect of
debt on inflation πb = πb (cb) is non-linear and concave. We plot the optimal response of the
private sector using a dashed line in the top chart of Panel II in Figure 1.
Dynamic complementarities and multiple discretionary equilibria. As in the previous
example, we can search for dynamic complementarities, which enable us to better understand the
nature of the discretionary equilibria. Following Cooper and John (1988), we say that we have a
dynamic complementarity if the optimal decision of one agent is increasing in the decision of the
other. In order to demonstrate complementarities it is convenient to look at the properties of the
welfare function.
As before, we can derive welfare given each agent’s response along the debt-stabilizing solution
that starts at given bt as
Wt = −1
2
∞∑
s=s
βs−t
(
π2s + αc
2
s
) eqs.(14,16)
= −1
2
(
(βρπb + ν + λcb − βηπbcb)2 + αc2b
) ∞∑
s=s
βs−tb2s
eqs.(12,14,15)
= −1
2
(
(βρπb + ν + λcb − βηπbcb)2 + αc2b
)
b2t
∞∑
s=t
(
β (ρ− ηcb)2
)s−t
= −1
2
(
(βρπb + λcb + ν − βηπbcb)2 + αc2b
)
(
1− β (ρ− ηcb)2
) b2t .
We also assume that welfare is finite so (ρ− ηcb)2 < 1/β. The second derivative is
∂2Wt
∂πb∂cb
=
− βρλ+ βνη
1− β (ρ− ηcb)2
+ 2
β2η ((ν + βρπb) + (λ− βηπb) cb)(
1− β (ρ− ηcb)2
)2
 b2t . (22)
If ∂
2Wt
∂πb∂cb
> 0 then we have dynamic complementarities between the private sector and the policy
decisions: Higher inflation, set by the firms in response to a higher debt level, increases the
marginal return to a policy decision that increases consumption in response to the higher debt.
The shaded area in the top chart of Panel II in Figure 1 shows where the decisions of the private
sector and of the policy maker are complementary whilst in the unshaded area the decisions
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Table 1: New Keynesian Model with Debt Accumulation: Characteristics of Discretionary Equi-
libria
Discretionary ‘Active’ Weakly ‘passive’ ‘Passive’
Equilibria A B C
Private πb 0.0095 0.1088 0.1885
sector ∂πt∂bt = (βρπb + ν) 0.0124 0.0993 0.1690
response ∂πt∂ct = (λ− βηπb) 0.0565 0.0378 0.0229
Policy cb −0.0513 0.2514 0.8505
Speed of adjustment bb 0.8935 0.8362 0.7228
Loss S 0.0005 0.0403 0.0867
Complementarities sign
(
∂2Wt/∂πb∂cb
) − + +
Numerical methods OS, BD, PP PP PP, BD∗
Notes:
∗ Obtained with initialization S = 1, πb = 0, Söderlind (1999)
are substitutable. Because of complementarities between the decisions of agents now multiple
equilibria can arise, see Cooper and John (1988), Vives (2005).
As the first chart in Panel II in Figure 1 demonstrates, for our parameterization we have three
discretionary equilibria. Two of them, labelled B and C, are in the area where there is dynamic
complementarity of the decisions of the aggregate private sector and of the policy maker. The
remaining equilibrium A is in the area where those decisions are substitutable. In Table 1 we
report the numerical characteristics of these equilibria.
If the policy maker knows that any next-period firm will raise inflation sufficiently high in
response to positive debt values, then it is optimal for the policy maker to increase consump-
tion. The higher future inflation is going to be, the higher consumption needs to be set; higher
consumption increases demand and thus further increases inflation, but higher consumption also
slows down the rise of inflation as the firms’ response to lower future taxes will reduce the re-
sponse to higher current demand. Dynamic complementarities are at work and two discretionary
equilibria, B and C, arise.
If the policy maker knows that the next-period firms will raise inflation only weakly or even
deflate in a response to a positive debt, then with stronger deflationary decisions by firms, the
policy maker will optimally raise consumption and demand and stabilize inflation. Consumption
and inflation are dynamic substitutes and only one equilibrium A arises.
Equilibrium trajectories. An initial deviation of debt from its steady state value, b¯ = 0, is
the only reason for the future dynamic adjustment of the economy in our model. Panel I in Figure
2 plots responses of the economy to an initial unit-deviation of debt from its steady state value.
The three solutions discussed above correspond to the three different paths towards the steady
state.
In equilibrium A the policy maker expects that firms anticipate that in the next period firms
will set low inflation and optimally respond with low consumption. The slow convergence of debt
is consistent with depressed demand and low inflation along the path.
13
In equilibria B and C the policy maker expects that firms anticipate that the next-period firms
will set high inflation and so consumption optimally increases. Higher consumption contributes
to faster debt stabilization. All responses are stronger in equilibrium C than in equilibrium B,
as we discussed above.
Numerical solution. Because of the simplicity of this model we are able to substitute (21)
into (19) and obtain the resulting expression in the form of a univariate polynomial with given
coefficients. We can then employ a standard numerical technique to find the roots of this polyno-
mial.17 We could instead specify parameters of the dynamic system (11)-(12) and of the policy
objective (13) and employ some numerical dynamic programming routines to obtain discretionary
equilibria directly. Two almost always used solution methods by Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and
Backus and Driffill (1986) employ essentially the same iterative algorithm that requires initial
values for πb and S and then updates them simultaneously.
18 Oudiz and Sachs (1985) suggest
using a particular initialization to begin iterations, while Backus and Driffill (1986) suggest that
any initialization should work. If the equilibrium is unique, as Oudiz and Sachs (1985) conjecture,
and the algorithm converges, then the choice of initialization should not matter indeed; Söderlind
(1999), who presents a popular implementation of this algorithm, also suggests using any positive
S and zero πb as a first guess.
With multiple equilibria different initializations of the same algorithm can lead to different
solutions. However, random initializations of a particular algorithm may not find all of possible
equilibria, and different algorithms with different asymptotic stability properties need to be con-
structed. The last line in Table 1 reports whether the equilibrium can be obtained by numerical
routines. In addition to the Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and Backus and Driffill (1986) algorithm
with different initializations, herewith labelled ‘OS’ and ‘BD’ correspondingly, we checked which
equilibria we obtain if for an arbitrary policy c0b we find π
0
b using (21), then find c
1
b using (19),
and use it to compute π1b and so on until convergence.
19 We label the latter algorithm ‘PP’ for
policy—private sector iterations and it is based on consecutive update of agents’ decisions and is
very different in stability properties from the OS/BD algorithm.20 Again, different initializations
of c0b can generate different equilibria, not necessarily those that are obtained by the OS/BD
algorithm.
All equilibria can be obtained by at least one of these iterative procedures, given some appro-
priate initializations and other parameters.
2.2.3 Switching equilibria
In this model with government debt the optimizing policy maker at time t chooses policy cb
knowing that the private sector’s decision πb explicitly depends on the private sector’s decision
π˜b in period t+1. All agents know that at any time s > t the optimizing policy maker will choose
the best policy, based on the current decision rule of the private sector that itself depends on
its own next-period decision rule. The period-(s+ 1) decision of the private sector is a function
17We used available MATLAB routines.
18Currie and Levine (1993) suggest a similar algorithm to solve continuous-time problems.
19Here superscrit is an iteration count.
20The stability properties of the PP algorithm crucially depend on the choice of damping between iterations.
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of period-(s + 1) policy and hence of period-(s + 2) private sector decisions. Thus, any policy
maker chooses current policy cb conditioned on the aggregated private sector’s beliefs about future
policy c˜b. The existing dynamic complementarities between the decisions of the private sector
and the policy maker create the possibility of different beliefs about the future course of policy;
with different beliefs, multiple discretionary equilibria arise.
In contrast to our first example, the presence of government debt eliminates the disconnect
between current and future periods, and different beliefs about future policy result in different
current actions by both sets of agents. Therefore, three different sets of beliefs correspond to
three different adjustment paths of the economy, with each of these paths differing in speed of
convergence back to equilibrium. Remember that in linear models all variables adjust at the
same speed (this is uniquely determined by ρ in the standard New Keynesian model). In this
example the presence of government debt is not only sufficient for multiplicity, but also necessary,
as different paths are only possible if the adjustment of the predetermined state (debt) is affected
by agents’ decisions.
The dynamic structure of interactions between the private sector and the policy maker implies
it is easy to move the economy from one equilibrium to another. Suppose that at time t agents
observe some positive bt. The monetary policy maker, which (as leader) is required to decide
first, reduces demand because (i) it knows that current-period firms are expecting tight monetary
policy in all (current and future) periods, and (ii) it anticipates that current-period firms, when
they make their current-period decisions, will rationally lower inflation given their expectations
of tight future policy. The policy maker rationally reduces demand and next-period debt remains
high.
Now suppose that after the current-period policy maker has acted, and if multiple equilibria
exist, current-period firms change their beliefs about future policy. Instead they now increase
inflation relative to the level that would be consistent with their former beliefs. They still react
to realized policy and to the state, but the strength of their reaction depends on their beliefs
about future policy. The next-period policy maker will observe high debt and high inflation and
will know that firms expect lax policy in all subsequent periods, and it will anticipate that all
future firms will increase inflation after the policy maker acts. We have shown that it will be
optimal for the next-period discretionary policy maker to validate the beliefs held by the private
sector at the time the next-period policy decision is made and stimulate demand.
Firms choose inflation based on beliefs, but they are free to change beliefs when making
decisions in the face of an exogenous event. Although the private sector observes current-period
policy and rationally responds to it, no precommitment of future policy makers to the-same-as-
observed policy coefficient cb is expected. The private sector only expects that the policy maker
will re-optimize, apply the same decision process, react to the current state and deliver the same
policy as expected at the time when the private sector makes the decision. Although the policy
maker moves first within each period, it cannot manipulate the beliefs of the private sector about
future policy. Albanesi et al. (2003) and King and Wolman (2004) characterize similar situations
as ‘expectations traps’.
This framework does not suggest which equilibria are more realistic or those that should be
preferred. Nothing in this model indicates how the private sector sets its beliefs about which
equilibrium will prevail if an exogenous event occurs. The framework implies that if there are
several possible equilibria and the private sector does change its beliefs about which one will
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prevail, then it is optimal for the policy maker to change policy. If some sufficiently ‘bad’ event
occurs and the private sector changes its beliefs, then the best the policy maker can do is to
validate the new beliefs of the private sector, and the welfare-dominant equilibrium becomes
unattainable.
2.2.4 Robustness of Results and their Empirical Relevance
The strength of fiscal control of debt and ‘active’/‘passive’ policies. Parameters ν and
ρ of the model in (11)-(12) are functions of parameter µ, the strength of fiscal feedback in the
underlying tax rule τ t = µbt. We vary µ between zero and some relatively large number and
plot πb, cb and welfare against µ in Panel II in Figure 2.
21 Different discretionary equilibria as
functions of µ correspond to different branches. Panel II in Figure 2 demonstrates that only
equilibrium C survives for small µ, in particular for µ = 0; as µ increases only equilibrium A
survives. If µ is sufficiently large then monetary policy reacts to debt only weakly and stabilizes
inflation in a conventional way, so can be classified as ‘active’. Fiscal policy can be classified as
‘passive’ as it is devoted entirely to the control of domestic debt. If µ is zero or relatively small
then monetary policy controls the debt tightly in order to ensure that it will converge back to
the steady state, so it can be classified as ‘passive’. Fiscal policy can be classified as ‘active’ as it
pursues some other targets but not the control of debt. In this regime inflation is accommodated
as this helps to reduce the real debt. Our classification resembles the one in Leeper (1991), but
it differs in policy design: we consider discretionary monetary policy, not a policy formulated
in terms of simple rules. We discover three equilibria for a weak fiscal feedback 0 < µ ≪ ∞.
Equilibria B and C are qualitatively similar, and only differ by the strength of reactions. It
may be difficult to distinguish them empirically. One of them may be implausible and further
research in equilibrium selection mechanisms may help to eliminate one of them. Because the
issues of equilibrium selection are beyond the scope of this paper, in the rest of this section we
simply distinguish between two types of interactions, and use equilibrium C to illustrate ‘passive’
monetary policy, as equilibrium B does not survive for very small values of µ.
Empirical relevance. Do we observe such multiple equilibria in practice? Some authors have
argued that we observe multiple regimes.22 In particular, Davig and Leeper (2006b) (herewith
DL) document fluctuating policies in the United States in terms of policy rules. DL identify four
different regimes depending on the interactions of monetary and fiscal policy. They assume that
economic policy is formulated in terms of simple rules and each policy maker can implement either
an ‘active’ or a ‘passive’ rule. As a result, there are four possible combinations of active/passive
monetary policy (we label them AM and PM correspondingly) and active/passive fiscal policy
(labelled AF and PF). The authors estimate these rules and document the sequence of movements
from one such regime to another in the post-war US history. We plot the sequence of regimes in
Panel III in Figure 2. This picture is adapted from Figure 5 in DL. For every year the relative
width of every color corresponds to the probability that each regime prevails. For example, in
21We plot welfare as minus loss, hence negative numbers. The loss is measured in percentage of steady state con-
sumption; the loss is small as we work with the deterministic model, assuming that the only sourse of displacement
is the higher debt level (1%) in the initial moment.
22See, for example, Engel and Hamilton (1990), Clarida et al. (2003), Davig and Leeper (2006a,b).
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1956 we have approximately a 70% probability of (PM, PF) regime and a 30% probability of
(PM, AF) while in 1985 there is an estimated 100% probability of (AM, AF). In 1945 the US
economy starts at (PM, AF) and it arrives back into the same state in 2005.
Davig and Leeper (2006a) discuss that it is generally difficult to justify optimal switching
policies, and so ad hoc simple-rules-based regime switches dominate the analysis. In this paper
we demonstrate that each of switching policies can be optimal under discretion. We argue that
the Markov-switching model in DL implies the same regimes that we identified as equilibria A and
C. Using our model we can interpret these movements as switches between the two discretionary
equilibria. Our fiscal feedback parameter µ is similar in effect to the fiscal feedback on output in
the estimated fiscal rules in DL. We use the bottom chart in Panel II in Figure 2 and label where
the four policy regimes identified by DL might lie. Arrows show all realized movements between
the states that happened in the post-war period in the US. Some of the changes in regimes can
be seen as switches between the two equilibria. Our model is silent the nature of the sunspot
that causes the ‘regime shifts’, but we note instead a rather particular sequence of ‘jumps’ and
‘falls’ between the two equilibria. The welfare-dominant equilibrium is attained in ‘jumps’ from
the state with lowest welfare only. There are three such ‘jumps’ from (PM, AF) to (AM, AF), in
1959, 1980 and in 1994, one of which resulted in an immediate ‘fall’ back. It is also apparent that
the route from the best to the worst equilibrium is via (AM, PF) to (PM, PF), and this route is
characterized by the minimal loss in welfare, as the distance between two branches in the welfare
chart in Panel II of Figure 2 is the smallest. These moves happened in 1991 and 2001, both
post-recession years in which the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates. The observed regularity
invites new research to explain the pattern, but further exploration is beyond the scope of this
paper.
2.3 New Keynesian Model with Capital Accumulation
The previous model demonstrates the existence of multiple equilibria in LQ RE models under
discretion and the role of endogenous predetermined states. It was deliberately chosen to as
simple as possible to enable us to do this in an effective way. More realistic models will have
several decision variables of agents and potentially several states. In most cases we invariably
resort to numerical methods of finding discretionary equilibria.
We now turn to a model with capital accumulation. This example demonstrates a further
feature of policy under discretion, and shows that LQ RE models can have two different types
of multiple equilibria. We have already shown that multiple equilibria can arise because of the
dynamic complementarity of the decisions of the private sector and the policy maker. Now we
show that the dynamic complementarity between the different decisions of the private sector can
also lead to multiple equilibria. King and Wolman (2004) obtain equilibria of this second type in
a non-linear model; they originate from what they call multiple ‘point-in-time’ equilibria.
The point-in-time equilibria are likely to generate multiple discretionary equilibria in any
moderately complex model, but they are difficult to find with conventional numerical algorithms.
In order to develop a successful algorithm we need to know the properties of equilibria we should
search for.
The primary objective of this example is to demonstrate the existence of multiple point-
in-time equilibria and show how their existence implies the existence of multiple discretionary
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equilibria. We shall generalize our results in Section 4. These results allow us to develop a
numerical algorithm that finds all point-in-time equilibria associated with any given policy and
reduces the number of discretionary equilibria that would otherwise remain undiscovered.
In order to demonstrate this type of multiplicity we need a model that has several private
sector decision variables. We use a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation, adopted
fromWoodford (2003a), Woodford (2005) and Sveen andWeinke (2005), that has just this feature.
As before, we delegate all technical details to the Online Appendix.
2.3.1 Discretionary Policy
Log-linearized about the steady state, the equations that describe the aggregate decisions of the
private sector and the evolution of the state can be written as
ct = ct+1 − σ(it − πt+1), (23)
∆kt+1 = β∆kt+2 +
1
εψ
((1− β (1− δ))mst+1 − (it − πt+1)) , (24)
πt = βπt+1 + λcct + λokt+1 − λkkt. (25)
The aggregate state variable in this economy is the real capital stock, kt and the initial state k¯
is known to all agents. Equation (23) is the standard Euler equation for aggregate consumption
expenditure ct, it is the nominal interest rate and πt is the inflation rate. Equation (24) describes
capital accumulation with depreciation rate δ, adjustment cost parameter εψ, and real marginal
savings mst =
φ+1
(1−α)
(
ζct +
1−ζ
δ (kt+1 − (1− δ)kt)
)
+ 1σ ct− αφ+1(1−α)kt.23 Equation (25) is the appro-
priate New Keynesian Phillips curve. The private sector chooses consumption, ct, inflation, πt,
and next-period capital, kt+1.
The policy maker’s control variable is nominal interest rate it. The inter-temporal policy
maker’s welfare criterion is defined by the quadratic loss function
Lt =
1
2
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
π2s + ωy
2
s
)
=
1
2
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
π2s + ω
(
ζcs +
1− ζ
δ
(ks+1 − (1− δ) ks)
)2)
,
where we substituted out output yt using the national income identity. Parameter ω is treated
as given.24
The policy maker knows the laws of motion (23)-(25) of the aggregate economy and takes them
into account when formulating its policy. The policy maker finds the best action every period,
knows that future policy makers have the freedom to change policy, and knows that future policy
makers will apply the same decision process.
23Parameters ζ, φ, σ and α are the steady state consumption to output ratio, elasticity of labour supply, inverse
elasticity of inter-temporal substitution of consumption, and capital share in production function, correspondingly.
Parameter β is the private sector’s discount factor. The system is log-linearized about the zero-inflation steady
state. We assume capital can be rented. All derived parameters are given in Appendix A.
24We use ‘traditional’ welfare metric for this case. This choice is unimportant for our results and is a reasonable
metric that an actual policymaker might choose for a complex model.
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Under discretion, at every point in time t the decision rule of each agent is a linear function
of the current state
it = ιkkt, (26)
kt+1 = kkkt (27)
ct = ckkt (28)
πt = πkkt. (29)
We lead (27)-(29) one period and use (23)-(25) to write private sector decisions as a response to
the state and response to policy
kt+1 = k˜S
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
kt + k˜P
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
it, (30)
πt = π˜S
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
kt + π˜P
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
it, (31)
ct = c˜S
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
kt + c˜P
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
it, (32)
where we use the subscripts S for state and P for policy. We also put tildes over the coefficients
to emphasize that they depend on the next-period decisions of the private sector, k˜k, c˜k and
π˜k. Written this way, (30)-(32) isolate the ‘instantaneous’ influence of policy on private sector
decisions. We report the exact form of the coefficients in Appendix A.
The Bellman equation characterizing discretionary policy becomes
Sk2t = min
it
(
(π˜Skt + π˜P it)
2 + ω
((
ζc˜S +
1− ζ
δ
(
k˜S − (1− δ)
))
kt (33)
+
(
ζc˜P +
1− ζ
δ
k˜P
)
it
)2
+ βS˜
(
k˜Skt + k˜P it
)2)
.
Differentiation of (33) with respect to it yields the optimal policy response
it = −
(
π˜P π˜S +
(
ζc˜P +
1−ζ
δ k˜P
)
ω
(
ζc˜S +
1−ζ
δ
(
k˜S − (1− δ)
))
+ βS˜k˜P k˜S
)
(
π˜2P + ω
(
ζc˜P +
1−ζ
δ k˜P
)2
+ βS˜k˜2P
) kt = ιkkt. (34)
The coefficient ιk in (34) determines the optimal policy feedback on the predetermined state, kt,
with the feedback coefficient a function of S˜. S˜ determines the next-period loss, which depends
on the whole future path of the state, which in turn is a function of future policy decisions. When
the current-period policy maker chooses the best policy, it knows that the next-period policy
maker will re-optimize. In this model this constraint is binding. It ensures the non-linearity of
ιk = ιk
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
.
In order to find the equilibrium value function S we substitute the optimal solution (34) into
the Bellman equation (33) and, under the equilibrium condition S = S˜, obtain the following
quadratic equation with positive leading coefficient and a negative constant term
βS2 + µS − ω
(
(1− ζ)
δ
(
π˜S −
(
k˜S − (1− δ)
) π˜P
k˜P
)
+ ζ
(π˜S c˜P − π˜P c˜S)
k˜P
)2
= 0,
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where coefficient µ = µ
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
is given in Appendix A. This equation has only one nonneg-
ative solution
S = − 1
2β
µ+
√
µ2 + 4βω
(
(1− ζ)
δ
(
π˜S −
(
k˜S − (1− δ)
) π˜P
k˜P
)
+ ζ
(π˜S c˜P − π˜P c˜S)
k˜P
)2
= S
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
= S (kk, ck, πk) .
The last equality holds for the time-invariant private sector response.
In order to obtain the optimal policy we substitute S into (34) to give
ιk = ιk
(
k˜k, c˜k, π˜k
)
= ιk (kk, ck, πk) . (35)
By construction, for every triplet {kk, ck, πk} that describes a time-invariant private sector re-
sponse we obtain a unique ιk that describes the policy decision.
2.3.2 Private Sector Response: Point-in-Time Equilibria
We substitute equation (26) into (30)-(32) and, after some manipulations, obtain the following
system that describes time-invariant optimal response of the private sector
kk =
1
βνk + λkνr
((
β
(
1− νok˜k
)
+ λoνr
)
kk − νrπk + (λcνr − βνc) ck + βνrιk
)
, (36)
πk = (βπ˜k + λo) kk + λcck − λk, (37)
ck =
1
β + σλc
((βc˜k − σλo)kk + σπk + σ (λk − βιk)) . (38)
where all coefficients ν are given in Appendix A. From the first two equations it is immediately
apparent that for a given policy ιk, in a response to a positive state kt higher consumption raises
inflation but it also makes profit optimizing firms increase next-period capital stock in order to
meet anticipated increased demand; higher next-period capital raises inflation too. The decisions
to raise consumption and to increase the next-period capital stock are dynamic complements.
In the previous example the decision of the private sector was unique given policy. Here
we have complementarity between the effects of different decisions of the private sector and
the multiplicity of point-in-time equilibria is likely to arise: there can be several private sector
responses to the same policy decision. The nature of the multiplicity is now different.
We now simplify system (36)-(38) by assuming the equilibrium conditions kk = k˜k, πk =
π˜k and ck = c˜k. We solve the last equation with respect to πk
πk =
1
σ
(σλokk + (β + σλc − βkk) ck + σ (βιk − λk)) , (39)
and substitute into the first two equations. We obtain the following system
ck = σ
(
νk − kk + νok2k
)
(νrkk − (νr + σνc)) , (40)
ck = σ
(
λok
2
k − (λk − βιk)kk − ιk
)(
βk2k − (1 + β + σλc) kk + 1
) . (41)
21
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
−2
0
2
4
6
8
kk
c k
I: POINT−IN−TIME EQUILIBRIA
FOR GIVEN ιk
 
 
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
k k
II: POINT−IN−TIME EQUILIBRIA
AS FUNCTION OF ιk
0 0.5 1
−3
−2
−1
0
1
c k
0 0.5 1
−4
−2
0
2
ιk
pi
k
 
 
eq.A eq.B
−1 0 1 2
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
ιk
k k
−1 0 1 2
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.5
0.51
0.52
0.53
ιk
c k
IV: DISCRETIONARY EQUILIBRIA B1 AND B2
−1 0 1 2
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
ιk
pi
k
 
 
0 0.5 1
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ιk
ι k*
III: DISCRETIONARY EQUILIBRIA
 
 
private
sector eq.A
private
sector eq.B
45o line
private sector policy
B
C
D
A
B1
B2
B1
B2
B1
B1
B2
B2
A
Figure 3: Discretionary Equilibria in the New Keynesian Model with Capital Accumulation
Solutions to this system for a given value of ιk are plotted in Panel I in Figure 3. We plot the
response ck (kk) , given by equation (40), with a solid line. We plot the response kk (ck) given by
equation (41) with a dash-dotted line.25 Now there are four pairs {ck, kk} that solve (40)-(41) and
are labelled as point-in-time equilibria A, B, C and D. For every pair {ck, kk} we can calculate
the unique πk (ck, kk) using (39). For all values of ιk in equilibria A and B the economy is stable
as |kk| < 1, while it is unstable in equilibria C and D with kk > 1. We do not consider equilibria
C and D further and plot how {ck, kk, πk} change with ιk in equilibria A and B in Panel II in
Figure 3. We use dotted and solid lines for equilibria A and B correspondingly.
It is apparent that in response to a given policy ιk the aggregate private sector coordinates
on one of the two point-in-time equilibria. Suppose the capital stock is higher than in the steady
state. In equilibrium A consumption and investment fall so that excessive capital stock is quickly
reduced. Inflation falls relatively fast because demand is low and the high level of productive
capital also has a deflationary effect. In equilibrium B consumption rises by only a little and
the next-period capital is chosen to ensure a slow reduction of the excessive capital stock. A
combination of the high level of productive capacity with high demand ensures only slight fall in
inflation. All variables converge back to the steady state much more slowly.
For a given ιk we compute the two triplets {ck (ιk) , kk (ιk) , πk (ιk)} that describe point-in-time
equilibria A and B. For every point-in-time equilibrium the discretionary policy maker will opti-
mally choose the unique ι∗k = ιk (ck, kk, πk) , see equation (35). For each triplet {ck (ιk) , kk (ιk) , πk (ιk)}
25We calibrate the model as β = 0.99, σ = 1, φ = 1, ε = 11, εψ = 3, α = 0.36 and δ = 0.025.
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Table 2: New Keynesian Model with Capital Accumulation: Characteristics of Discretionary
Equilibria
Discretionary ‘Fast’ ‘Moderately Slow’ ‘Slow’
Equilibria A B1 B2
Private kk 0.2625 0.9552 0.9630
sector ck -2.3367 -0.2257 -0.0145
response πk -1.8590 0.5232 0.5155
Policy ιk 0.7577 -0.2391 -0.0331
Speed of adjustment kk 0.2625 0.9552 0.9630
Loss S 6.4064 0.5302 0.0102
Complementarities sign
(
∂2Wt
∂kk∂ιk
, ∂
2Wt
∂πk∂ιk
, ∂
2Wt
∂ck∂ιk
)
(+,−,+) (+,+,−) (+,+,+)
Numerical
methods
BD∗, PP PP OS, BD, PP
Notes:
∗ Obtained with initialization S = 1, πk = ck = kk = 0, Söderlind (1999).
we plot ι∗k = ι
∗
k (ck (ιk) , kk (ιk) , πk (ιk)) ≡ ι∗k (ιk) with dotted and solid lines for point-in-time equi-
libria A and B correspondingly in Panel III in Figure 3. Points of intersection of lines ι∗k = ι
∗
k (ιk)
with the 45-degree line are points of discretionary policy equilibria.
The dotted line (point-in-time equilibrium A) intersects the 45-degree line once. If the pol-
icy maker expects that the private sector coordinates on equilibrium A, it will choose positive
ιk. Acting consistently with current and future positive response of interest rate to the higher-
than-steady-state-level of capital, the private sector coordinates on the equilibrium with a large
contraction in demand and investment and low inflation. Capital is stabilized quickly.
The solid line (point-in-time equilibrium B) intersects the 45-degree line twice, points labelled
B1 and B2 in Panel III in Figure 3. If the policy maker expects that the point-in-time equilibrium
B will prevail, it chooses negative ιk.Acting consistently with current and future negative response
of the interest rate to higher-than-steady-state-level of capital, the private sector coordinates on
an equilibrium with a small expansion in demand, a small contraction in future capital stock and
a small fall in inflation. However, in this case there are dynamic complementarities between the
decisions of the private sector and the policy maker, so two discretionary equilibria arise, similar
to the previous example with government debt. The mechanism is also similar: lower marginal
cost results in lower inflation which implies a lower interest rate and so results in lower marginal
cost.
Specifically, suppose the real capital stock is above the steady state, kt > 0. Suppose that
the policy maker knows that the private sector believes that the future policy maker will lower
interest rate in response to any positive kt. Suppose the policy maker expects that in a response
to the current-period fall in interest rate the aggregated private sector coordinates on equilibrium
B with higher consumption, slightly lower next-period capital and small fall in inflation. It will
be optimal for the policy maker to reduce the interest rate and validate the beliefs of the private
sector. However, assume a further fall in interest rate. It results in even higher consumption,
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which crowds out investment even more and so the next-period capital stock is even lower. The
deflationary effect of even lower next-period capital stock on marginal cost outweighs the effect
of consumption, so inflation falls by more, that makes the assumed further fall in the interest
rate both rational and optimal. Multiple discretionary policy equilibria B1 and B2 arise, further
illustrated in Panel IV in Figure 3.26 All characteristics of the three equilibria A, B1 and B2 are
reported in Table 2.
As in our previous examples we can formally check whether the private sector and policy
maker decisions are dynamic complements. Straightforward substitutions yield the following
welfare function
Wt = −1
2
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
π2s + ω
(
ζcs +
1− ζ
δ
(ks+1 − (1− δ)ks)
)2)
= −1
2
(
(πS + πP ιk)
2 + ω
(
ζ (cS + cP ιk) +
1− ζ
δ
(kS + kP ιk − (1− δ))
)2) k2t
1− βk2k
.
We compute the sign of each of the second order derivatives ∂
2Wt
∂kk∂ιk
, ∂
2Wt
∂πk∂ιk
and ∂
2Wt
∂ck∂ιk
for each of
the discretionary equilibria A, B1 and B2 and report them in Table 2. It is apparent that in each
equilibrium at least one derivative is positive. Hence, the private sector and the policy maker
decisions are dynamic complements and each point-in-time equilibrium can generate more than
one discretionary equilibrium, as we have demonstrated.
2.3.3 Numerical Solution
The simplicity of this particular model and the prior knowledge of the number and location of the
equilibria allows us to use polynomial root-finding algorithms to find them. However, as in our
previous example, we also checked which equilibria can be obtained with numerical algorithms
OD and BD. We present the results in the last line of Table 2. This algorithm can deliver both
equilibria A and B2.
We can also compute all point-in-time equilibria for some policy decision ι0k. Then, for each
point-in-time equilibrium that stabilizes the economy we can use (34) and compute optimal policy
ι1k. We then use ι
1
k to compute the same point-in-time equilibrium and so on until convergence.
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If this iterative procedure converges, then we label the resulting equilibrium with ‘PP’ in Table
2. We are able to get equilibria A, B1 and B2 in this way.
To motivate subsequent generalizations in Sections 3-5, note that the PP iterative algorithm
is different from the OS and BD algorithm in its asymptotic stability properties and identical
initializations of the PP and of the OS/BD algorithm can lead to different equilibria. It is also
important that we know how many point-in-time equilibria exist before searching for discretionary
equilibria. If we use a particular iterative algorithm to find all responses of the private sector,
the multiplicity of point-in-time equilibria implies that we may not be able to find all of them,
regardless of initialization. The knowledge of the nature of the solution we seek helps to design
different algorithms, with different stability properties.
26Because of multi-variate private sector’s response, Panel IV plots optimal policy given the private sector’s
response to a policy. In the previous example in Figure 1 we plotted the optimal policy for an arbitrary decision of
the private sector.
27Here superscrit is an iteration count.
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3 The General Framework
In the previous section we demonstrated the existence of multiple equilibria by examining partic-
ular models and were able to use the useful expository device of dynamic complementarities to
describe the mechanisms at work. Now we extend some of our results for the entire class of non-
singular LQ RE models. First, we prove that in an economy without endogenous predetermined
state variables the discretionary equilibrium is unique, as in our first example. Second, we show
how many policy-induced ‘point-in-time’ private sector equilibria exist and discuss how to find
all of them. This result eliminates the need to search for dynamic complementarities between
the private sector’s actions in order to assess the possibility of multiple point-in-time equilibria.
Third, we prove that for a given private sector response, the optimal policy decision is unique.
Forth, we demonstrate that (for most economic applications) there is a finite number of locally
isolated, or determinate, equilibria. These results have important implications for the design
of the numerical algorithms needed to locate and isolate many of the equilibria that cannot be
found using more conventional methods. We also present an algorithm that was able to locate
all equilibria in our examples.
3.1 Discretionary Policy
We assume a non-singular linear deterministic rational expectations model, augmented by a vector
of control instruments. Specifically, the evolution of the economy is explained by the linear system[
yt+1
xt+1
]
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
][
yt
xt
]
+
[
B1
B2
]
[ut] , (42)
where yt is an n1-vector of predetermined variables with initial conditions y0 given, xt is n2-vector
of non-predetermined (or jump) variables with limt→∞ xt = 0, and ut is a k−vector of policy
instruments of the policy maker. For notational convenience we define the n-vector zt = (y′t, x
′
t)
′
where n = n1 + n2. We assume A22 is non-singular.
Typically, the second block of equations in this system represents an aggregation of the first
order conditions to the optimization problems of the private sector, which has decision variables xt.
Additionally, there is a first block of equations which explains the evolution of the predetermined
state variables yt. (Such predetermined states include observed shocks, lagged decision variables,
including inflation and interest rates, as well as stock variables.) These two blocks describe the
‘evolution of the economy’ as observed by the policy maker.
The inter-temporal policy maker’s welfare criterion is defined by the quadratic loss function
Lt =
1
2
∞∑
s=t
βs−tg′sQgs =
1
2
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
z′sQzs + 2z
′
sPus + u
′
sRus
)
. (43)
The elements of vector gs are the goal variables of the policy maker, gs = C(z′s, u′s)′. Matrix Q is
assumed to be symmetric and positive semi-definite.28
28 It is standard to assume that R is symmetric positive definite (see Anderson et al. (1996), for example).
However, since many economic applications involve a loss function that places no penalty on the control variables,
we note that the requirement of Q being positive definite can be weakened to Q being positive semi-definite if
additional assumptions about other system matrices are met (Clements and Wimmer (2003)). The analysis in this
paper is valid for R ≡ 0.
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Assumption 1 Suppose that at any time t the private sector and the policy maker respond only
to the current state
ut = F (yt) = −Fyt, (44)
xt = N (yt) = −Nyt. (45)
This assumption rules out non-stationarity of policy and private sector decisions, i.e. any time-
dependence from the more general formulation ut = F(t; yt, yt−1, .., yt−k, ..), xt = N (t; yt, yt−1, .., yt−k, ..),
and restricts policy decisions to memoryless feedback rules. We also assume that rules are linear
in the state.
We define discretionary policy as satisfying several constraints. We want to assume that the
policy maker can implement (or truthfully announce) at each point of time its policy decision
before the private sector selects its own action xt.
Assumption 2 At each time t the private sector observes the current decision ut and expects
that future policy makers at any time s > t will re-optimize, will apply the same decision process
and implement policy (44).
Proposition 1 Given Assumption (2) the current aggregate decision of the private sector can be
written as a linear feedback function
xt = −Jyt −Kut, (46)
where
J (N) = (A22 +NA12)
−1(A21 +NA11), (47)
K (N) = (A22 +NA12)
−1(B2 +NB1). (48)
Proof. Relationship (45) can be taken with one lead forward and yt+1 is substituted from the
first equation (42). We obtain:
xt+1 = −N˜yt+1 = −N˜(A11yt +A12xt +B1ut) (49)
= A21yt +A22xt +B2ut,
from where it follows:
xt = −(A22 + N˜A12)−1[(A21 + N˜A11)yt + (B2 + N˜B1)ut] = −J
(
N˜
)
yt −K
(
N˜
)
ut. (50)
where J
(
N˜
)
and K
(
N˜
)
are defined as in (47)-(48). Invertibility of A22 ensures invertibility of
A22 + N˜A12 almost surely.
Proposition 1 implies that the policy maker, which moves before the private sector, takes
into account its ‘instantaneous’ influence on the choice of xt, which is measured by −K
(
N˜
)
and
which also depends on the future response of the private sector to the state, N˜.
Assumption 3 At each point in time t the policy maker knows Assumptions 1 and 2.
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Definition 1 Policy determined by (44) is discretionary if the policy maker finds it optimal to
continue to follow it in every period s > t given Assumptions (1) — (3).
Hence, we look for a policy ut that satisfies the following Bellman equation
Lt (yt) = min
ut
(
1
2
(
y′sQ
∗yt + 2y
′
tP
∗ut + u
′
tR
∗us
)
+ βLt+1 (A
∗yt +B
∗ut)
)
,
with
Q∗ = Q11 −Q12J − J ′Q21 + J ′Q22J, P ∗ = J ′Q22K −Q12K + P1 − J ′P2, (51)
R∗ = K ′Q22K +R−K′P2 − P ′2K, A∗ = A11 −A12J, B∗ = B1 −A12K. (52)
Because of the quadratic nature of the per-period objective in (43) and because policy and private
sector decisions are both linear in the state, the discounted loss will necessarily have quadratic
form in the state
Lt (yt) =
1
2
y′tSyt. (53)
The Bellman equation characterizing discretionary policy, therefore, becomes
y′tSyt = minut
(
y′s
(
Q∗ + βA∗′SA∗
)
yt + 2y
′
t
(
P ∗ + βA∗′SB∗
)
ut + u
′
t
(
R∗ + βB∗′SB∗
)
ut
)
. (54)
We have outlined a deterministic setup, both here and in the examples in Section 2. However,
none of the results depend on this, as we can always add an appropriate vector of shocks and
appeal to the certainty equivalence property of LQ models. This, however, would complicate the
analysis unnecessarily in order to demonstrate the main point.29
For a policy F and the private sector response N , the evolution of the state variable satisfies
the following equation
yt+1 =Myt, (55)
where M = A11 −A12N −B1F.
3.2 Discretionary equilibrium as a ‘triplet’ of matrices
Given y0 and system matrices A and B, matrices N and F define the trajectories {ys, xs, us}∞s=t
in a unique way and vise versa: if we know that {ys, xs, us}∞s=t solve discretionary optimization
problem stated above then, by construction, there are unique time-invariant linear relationships
between them which we label by N and F. Matrix S defines the cost-to-go along a trajectory.
Given the one-to-one mapping between equilibrium trajectories and {ys, xs, us}∞s=t and the triplet
of matrices T = {N,S, F}, it is convenient to continue with definition of policy equilibrium in
terms of T , not trajectories.
The following Proposition derives the first order conditions for a discretionary optimization
problem.
29Shocks can be included into vector yt, see e.g. Anderson et al. (1996).
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Proposition 2 (First order conditions) The first-order conditions to the discretionary opti-
mization problem (42) — (43) can be written in the following form
N = (A22 +NA12)
−1((A21 −B2F ) +N(A11 −B1F )), (56)
F = (R∗ + βB∗′SB∗)−1
(
P ∗′ + βB∗′SA∗
)
, (57)
S = Q∗ + F ′R∗F − F ′P ∗′ − P ∗F + β (A∗ −B∗F )′ S (A∗ −B∗F ) , (58)
where matrices Q∗, P ∗, R∗, A∗, and B∗ are defined in (47)-(48) and (51)-(52)
Proof. From relationships (45) and (46) it immediately follows that
N = J −KF. (59)
A straightforward substitution of (47)-(46) into (59) leads to (56)
The discretionary policy can be determined from (54) by differentiating with respect to ut
ut = −(R∗ + βB∗′SB∗)−1(P ∗′ + βB∗′SA∗)yt = −Fyt,
from where the policy maker’s reaction function is defined by (57). Now, we substitute policy
ut = −Fyt into (54) and obtain equation (58) for S.
Definition 2 The triplet T = {N,S,F} is a discretionary equilibrium if it satisfies the system
of first order conditions (56)-(58).
Definition 2 implicitly assumes that the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient
conditions of optimality. We proceed with this assumption and demonstrate later in Proposition
5 that, under the assumption of symmetric positive semi-definite Q, the second order conditions
for the minimum are always satisfied.
4 Properties of discretionary equilibria
This section describes some properties of discretionary equilibria that can help to locate them.
We start the section on multiple equilibria with demonstration of a particular case where the
discretionary equilibrium is unique. 30
Proposition 3 (A Special Case) Suppose A22 is non-singular, A12 = 0 and B1 = 0. Then if
the discretionary equilibrium exists it is unique.
Proof. Formulae (46) suggests K = A−122 B2 so it does not depend on N . It follows that R
∗ does
not depend on N and, generally speaking, is non-singular.
Equation (59) can be written as
A22N −NA11 = A21 −B2F,
30Proposition 3 proves what appears to be a well known fact, but we were unable to find a published proof.
Typically, when dealing with a particular problem in this class of models, researchers easily find the particular
solution, and it is clear that it is unique by construction, see e.g. Clarida et al. (1999).
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so there is no quadratic term in N . Similarly, equation (57) collapses to
F = (R∗)−1
((
B′2A
−1′
22 Q′22 −P ′2
)
(N +A−122 B2F )−
(Q12A−122 B2 −P1)′) ,
and hence S does not affect F . Both equations together constitute a linear in coefficients of F and
N system of (k+n2)n1 equations (after applying the vec-operator). If the system is non-singular,
the solution is unique. Having determined F we can find corresponding S from equation (58),
which always has a unique symmetric solution, as we demonstrate in later in this section.
In this example, B1 = 0 suggests that predetermined state variables cannot be affected by
policy and A12 = 0 suggests that they cannot be affected by private sector’s decisions. A typical
example of models in this class is a system where the only predetermined variables are potentially
(auto-)correlated shocks, which are exogenous predetermined state variables. This is by no means
uncommon in models that omit potentially important endogenous predetermined state variables
such as capital or debt for the sake of simplicity.
Formally, our assumptions result in two of three non-linear first order conditions, (56)-(58),
becoming linear and disconnected from the third equation in this special case. It is clear that
this is unlikely to happen under more general conditions. In what follows, we shall study the
first-order conditions in their most general form. Proposition 3 suggests that the model has to
have predetermined endogenous state variables in order to be able to generate multiple equilibria
under discretion.
The absence of endogenous predetermined state variables ensures complete disconnect between
time periods. Discretionary policy maker knows that all future policy makers will re-optimize
but without endogenous states this has no implications for the current policy choice.
Example in Section 2.3 demonstrates existence of multiple point-in-time equilibria. We explain
their existence by dynamic complementarities of decisions of the private sector, given policy. In
general case, it is more difficult to find complementarities among private sector’s decisions than
to find all point-in-time equilibria directly.
For a given policy response written in the form of linear rule ut = −Fyt the coefficients of
(56) depend only on the structural system matrices A and B. The next Proposition describes all
solutions N = N(F ).
Proposition 4 Under the following conditions:
i) matrix C =
[
A11 −B1F A12
A21 −B2F A22
]
has all distinct eigenvalues, and V22 in diagonalization
C = V −1ΛV is invertible for any permutation of eigenvalues in Λ;
ii) for some ρ ∈ R, ρ > 0, m is the number of eigenvalues of C that are strictly less than ρ in
modulus;
one of the three following situations is almost always possible.
1. If m = n2 then there is a unique solution N to (56) such that all eigenvalues of transition
matrix M = A11 −A12N −B1F in
yt+1 = (A11 −B1F ) yt +A12xt =Myt
are strictly less than ρ in modulus.
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2. If m > n2 then there are no solutions to (56) such that all eigenvalues of matrix M(N) are
strictly less than ρ in modulus.
3. If m < n2 then there are at most
(
n−m
n2−m
)
of different solutions N to (56) such that all
eigenvalues of matrix M(N) are strictly less than ρ in modulus. Only one solution is locally
asymptotically stable. All solutions can be found using standard eigenvalue decomposition
methods.
This proposition generalizes the well known Blanchard and Kahn (1980) condition for rational
expectations equilibrium to the class of time-invariant solutions. We prove it in Appendix B.
Condition i) rules out a continuum of solutions to (56), as shown by Freiling (2002). Condition
ii) leaves the choice of parameter ρ to a researcher. Parameter ρ defines the asymptotic growth rate
of yt. Because in infinite-horizon optimization problems transversality conditions are necessary
conditions, i.e. they follow from optimization, setting ρ = 1/
√
β is the most nonrestrictive.31
In all examples in Section 2 the policy maker had only one instrument, either demand or
interest rate. For these examples we demonstrated the uniqueness of optimal policy response,
given time-invariant private sector response. The next Proposition states that the result holds
even for multi-variate policy instrument. The proof is delegated to Appendix C.
Proposition 5 Suppose N is given. The following two results hold:
1. There is a unique symmetric positive semi-definite solution S to (58) if the matrix pair
(A∗, B∗) is controllable, i.e. if the controllability matrix [B∗, A∗B∗, A∗2B∗, ..., A∗n1−1B∗]
has full row rank;32
2. The policy function F , which is uniquely determined from (57) for given S, is such that all
eigenvalues of transition matrix M (that defines the evolution of the system under control)
yt+1 = A11yt +A12xt +B1ut = (A11 −A12J) yt + (B1 −A12K)ut
= (A∗ −B∗F ) yt =M (F (S)) yt, (60)
are strictly less than 1/
√
β in modulus.
It follows that lim
t→∞
β−t/2yt = 0. Thus, the policy reaction function ensures finite loss. It also
follows that necessary conditions for optimality (58)-(57) are sufficient, because with symmetric
and positive semi-definite matrix S the second-order conditions for minimum are always satisfied.
Propositions 4 and 5 demonstrate that the private sector and the policy maker are ‘non-
symmetric’ agents: while multiple private sector equilibria are possible if there are several decision
instruments, the optimal response of the policy maker is always unique regardless the number of
policy instruments.
31 It is sometimes suggested to set ρ = 1 (which is the case in Blanchard and Kahn (1980)). The over-restrictiveness
of ρ = 1 is discussed, for example, in Sims (2001) for a similar class of LQ RE problems.
32The requirement of controllability of (A∗, B∗) is standard for the linear-quadratic optimal control. We use this
condition as a sufficient condition. We do not discuss whether this is necessary condition.
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Corollary 1 Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that distinct discretionary equilibria have different
matrices N and vice versa. Therefore, we can label a discretionary equilibrium not by a triplet of
matrices, T = {N,S, F} but by a single matrix ‘identifier’ N .
Finally, we claim that all discretionary equilibria are determinate in the following sense.
Definition 3 Discretionary equilibrium is determinate if, for given initial conditions, {zt}∞t=0
is a path under optimal discretionary policy then there exist no other path {z˜t}∞t=0 such that
‖zt − z˜t‖ < ε in each period, where ε > 0 is any arbitrary small real number.
Thus determinacy is viewed as a property of trajectories and not of their limit points.
Proposition 6 Suppose we can find a discretionary equilibrium and compute the Jacobian of the
system of first order conditions (56)-(58), J . If det (J ) = 0 then:
1. There can be at most a finite number of other discretionary equilibria.
2. All discretionary equilibria are determinate.
Proof. There is a one-to-one correspondence between a trajectory and a triplet T = {N,S,F}.
q = (n+ k) × n1 coefficients of T solve polynomial system (56)-(58) of q equations. If the
determinant of the Jacobian of the polynomial system of first order conditions is not equal to
zero identically, then the system can only have a finite number of locally isolated solutions T .
The local isolation is equivalent to determinacy.
We can say nothing if det (J ) = 0 as it can either be equal to zero identically and so a
continuum of solutions is possible, or it might be that det (J ) has an isolated zero in this point
and, again, we have the finite number of locally isolated discretionary equilibria. Condition
det (J ) = 0 is likely to be satisfied in most economic applications.33
5 Finding Equilibria
Examples 2 and 3 in Section 2 demonstrate that the number of discretionary equilibria can
be greater than the number of point-in-time equilibria if there are dynamic complementarities
between the policy decision and private sector decisions. Although a search for complementarities
can help to understand why multiplicity arises, it is difficult to use this information in order to
find the equilibria, or to prove that there is no more than
( n−m
n2−m
)
equilibria.
Our examples show that even simple models lead to very complex systems of polynomial
equations to solve. Practically, we have to rely on numerical solutions. The current literature on
discretionary policy, which uses a numerical approach to find equilibria, almost always uses some
variations of the OS and BD iterative algorithms based on a simultaneous update of S and N .
The examples in Section 2 show that different initializations of the same algorithm can converge
to different solutions.
However, as we have seen, different algorithms, that are based on different updating schemes,
may converge to different solutions even if we start with the same initialization. Propositions
33The Online Appendix gives the expression for the Jacobian.
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4 and 5 have practical implications for the design of different numerical routines. Proposition
4 states how to find all point-in-time equilibria for an arbitrary policy F . The proposition also
implies that iterative algorithms to findN are unhelpful — they only find the unique locally asymp-
totically stable solution — but eigenvalue decomposition methods find all solutions. Proposition
5 implies that for any private sector response, N, we can use any algorithm to search for for the
optimal policy, F, as the solution is unique, no local extrema exists and so the initialization does
not matter. One can iterate between F and the corresponding N as we did in examples (the PP
algorithm), and find discretionary equilibria that are impossible to locate with the OS/BD algo-
rithm.34 Propositions 4 and 5 provide a guide to locating and separating discretionary solutions.
Finally, when solving a stochastic model we can substantially reduce the size of the problem. In
stochastic LQ RE models we write shocks as part of the vector of predetermined state variables.35
The resulting number of predetermined states may be substantial. However, because exogenous
state variables are not the source of multiplicity in LQ RE models, we prove in the Online
Appendix the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 A stochastic LQ RE model can be solved in two steps. First, solve the deter-
ministic model where all shock variables are excluded. Second, compute the coefficients on the
stochastic components that make up matrices N and F and the necessary components of matrix
S in a unique way.
Hence, the search for multiple solutions in models of discretionary policy can only involve their
endogenous deterministic components; this often keeps the dimension of the problem relatively
low.
6 Conclusion
We have described discretionary equilibria in the general class of LQ RE models. We illustrated
the potential for existence of multiple rational expectations equilibria. Because decisions of the
policymaker depend on expectations of the private sector that are based on future policy, dynamic
complementarities between decisions of agents can create multiplicity, and different beliefs about
future policy correspond to different discretionary equilibria. The policy maker cannot control
the expectations of the private sector about future policy, and current policy decisions have to
accommodate the expectations set by the past-period private sector. A sunspot, that changes
private sector beliefs about future policy, determines which equilibrium will prevail.
These interactions and sunspot-driven changes between equilibria can generate rich dynamics,
similar to those often observed in aggregate data.
We generalized several results to the entire class of non-singular LQ RE models. We described
all types of equilibria that can arise in these models. Our analysis can be used to develop numerical
methods that find most discretionary equilibria.
34We discuss numerical algorithms and search strategies in more details in the Online Appendix.
35See e.g. Anderson et al. (1996).
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A Parameters of Models in Examples
λc = κ
(
(φ+ α) ζ
1− α +
1
σ
)
, λo = κ
(φ+ α) (1− ζ)
(1− α) δ , λk = κ
(
(φ+ α) (1− ζ) (1− δ)
δ (1− α) +
α (1 + φ)
(1− α)
)
ζ = 1− δα (ε− 1)
ε (δ − lnβ) , ν¯ =
(
εψ (1 + β) +
(1− β (1− δ))
1− α
(
(φ+ 1) (1− ζ) (1− δ)
δ
+ αφ+ 1
))−1
,
νo =
(
εψβ +
(1− β (1− δ)) (φ+ 1) (1− ζ)
(1− α) δ
)
ν¯, νc = (1− β (1− δ))
(
(φ+ 1) ζ
1− α +
1
σ
)
ν¯,
νr =
(
1− (1− β (1− δ))
(
(φ+ 1) ζσ
(1− α) + 1
))
ν¯, νk = εψν¯, ξ = 1− (νr + σνc)πk − νcck − νokk,
kS =
νk
ξ
, kP = −(νr + σνc)
ξ
, cS =
νkck + νkσπk
ξ
, cP =
−σ − νrck + σνokk
ξ
,
πS =
1
ξ
(−λk + νkλo + ((β + σλc) νk + (νr + σνc)λk)πk + (λcνk + νcλk) ck + λkνokk) ,
πP = −1
ξ
(σλc + λoνr + σνcλo + β (νr + σνc)πk + λcνrck − σλcνokk)
µ =
(
π2P
k2P
+ ω
(
η
cP
kP
+ γ
)2
− β
((
πP
kS
kP
− πS
)2
+ ω
(
η
(
cS − cP kS
kP
)
− γ (1− δ)
)2))
B Proof of Proposition (4)
First, all solutions of equation (56) also solve the Non-Symmetric Continuous Algebraic Riccati
Equation
NC12N +C22N −NC11 −C21 = 0. (61)
Indeed, we multiply both sides of (56) by (A22+NA12) and, at most, we also acquire all solutions
of A22 +NA12 = 0. Matrix C was defined in Proposition (4).
By assumption, matrix C can be diagonalized as C = V −1ΛV .36 Matrix V is the matrix
of left eigenvectors which correspond to eigenvalues Λ. Arrange the eigenvalues so that Λu is a
diagonal matrix of size n2 and Λs a diagonal matrix of size n1 = n− n2. Rearrange similarly V
and partition it to give
Λ =
[
Λs 0
0 Λu
]
and V =
[
V11 V12
V21 V22
]
.
Now, construct N = V −122 V21. Matrix V22 is invertible by assumption, but this assumption is
unlikely to be restrictive.
It is known from the control literature (see e.g. Medanic (1982) Th. 1, Freiling (2002) Th.
3.3) that any solution of (61) can be represented in the form of V −122 V21 for some adequate Jordan
36 In what follows we always assume that matrix C is simple, i.e. all its eigenvalues are of geometric multiplicity
one, and the column rank of M is equal to n. This case is of practical interest; but Freiling (2002) discusses
implications of higher geometric multiplicity.
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basis of C. If all eigenvalues of C are simple then there are at most
( n
n2
)
of different solutions N .
Note that we did not make any assumptions about matrices Λs and Λu apart from assuming that
they are of particular size.
We fix some value ρ > 0 and rearrange rows of V such that Λu collects all eigenvalues that
are greater than ρ in modulus. Suppose there are m ≤ n2 of them, so Λu might also have
n2 −m eigenvalues that are not greater than ρ in modulus. For any solution N in the form of
V −122 V21 matrix M = C11 − C12V −122 V21. Freiling (2002), Blake (2004) prove that the eigenvalues
of C11 −C12V −122 V21 are Λs and the eigenvalues of C11 +C22V −122 V21 are Λu.
It follows that ifm = n2 then Λu is uniquely determined and V
−1
22 V21 is a unique solution (as in
Blanchard and Kahn (1980)). If m < n2 we can construct Λu in at most
( n−m
n2−m
)
ways, collecting
different combinations of smaller than ρ in modulus eigenvalues into Λu, and correspondingly
rearranging rows of matrix V .
Medanic (1982) demonstrates that only one of these
( n−m
n2−m
)
solutions, the dichotomic solution,
is locally asymptotically stable.
C Proof of Proposition (5)
First, equation (58) is equivalent to the following Discrete Algebraic Riccati Equation
S = Q∗ + βA∗′SA∗ − (P ∗′ + βB∗′SA∗)′ (R∗ + βB∗′SB∗)−1 (P ∗′ + βB∗′SA∗) , (62)
provided we can use (57). Indeed, start with (62) and add and subtract additional terms:
S = Q∗ + βA∗′SA∗ − (βB∗′SA∗ + P ∗′)′F = Q∗ + F ′R∗F − F ′P ∗′ − P ∗F
+β (A∗ −B∗F )′ S (A∗ −B∗F ) + F ′P ∗′ − F ′R∗F + βF ′B∗′S (A∗ −B∗F )
= Q∗ + F ′R∗F − F ′P ∗′ − P ∗F + β (A∗ −B∗F )′ S (A∗ −B∗F )
+F ′
[
βB∗′S (A∗ −B∗F ) + P ∗′ −R∗F ] .
The term in square brackets is zero because of (57) and we obtain (58).
Second, properties of solutions to equation (62) are known from the control literature. If
the pair matrices (β
1
2A∗, β
1
2B∗) in (62) is controllable (i.e. if the k × n1 controllability matrix
[β
1
2B∗, β
2
2A∗B∗, β
3
2A∗2B∗, ..., β
n1
2 A∗n1−1B∗] has rank n1 or full row rank) then the solution pair
{S, F} to (62) and (57) exists and unique, and all eigenvalues of matrix β 12M = β 12 (A∗ −B∗F ) are
strictly inside the unit circle, see e.g. (Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972, Ch. 6)). The controllability
of (β
1
2A∗, β
1
2B∗) is equivalent to the controllability of (A∗, B∗).
Third, it is also a textbook result that matrix S is symmetric and positive semi-definite if
Qˆ∗ =
[
Q∗ P ∗
P ∗′ R∗
]
is symmetric and positive semi-definite. One can easily demonstrate that
Qˆ∗ = (CΨ)′Q (CΨ) , where Ψ =
 I 0−J −K
0 I
 and C is defined in Section 3.1. Because Q is
symmetric and positive semi-definite by assumption then Qˆ∗ has the same properties. Hence S
is symmetric and positive semi-definite.
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